

A Logical Approach to Privacy-Aware Access to Data

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Introduction

Why do we need access control?

- ▶ We want to have one knowledge base that is accessed by all users, but...
- ▶ We want to prevent different users from retrieving different kinds of information
- ▶ Method to define who is allowed to access what information is needed

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Goals of this presentation

- ▶ Create Description Logic ontology representing a simple social network
- ▶ Use views to control access and enforce privacy policy

Access Control on the Semantic Web

Questions

- ▶ What are views?
- ▶ What is an ontology?
- ▶ What is Description Logic?
- ▶ How can views be used to restrict access to Description Logic ontologies?

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Views

- ▶ Traditionally used in relational database world
- ▶ Filter data that user can access
- ▶ Can combine data from different relations
- ▶ Can be used to hide sensitive data from user

Views - Example

users				
id	nick	password	real_name	address
1	john	e64f6...	John Meyer	Austin, TX
2	kate	a2cd5...	Kate Stevenson	Miami, FL



users_public	
id	nick
1	john
2	kate

What is an ontology?

Ontologies

- ▶ Specify which concepts appear in a certain domain and how they are related to each other

What is an ontology?


Ontologies

- ▶ Specify which concepts appear in a certain domain and how they are related to each other

Example: Simple social network

- ▶ Concepts: User, Group, Picture
- ▶ Relations:
 - ▶ Users are friends with other users
 - ▶ Users are members of groups
 - ▶ Users have pictures
 - ▶ Users are shown on pictures

Example: Ontology representing social network



Introduction to Description Logic

- ▶ DL knowledge base consists of TBox and ABox
- ▶ Knowledge represented by concepts and roles

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ABox

User(john)

User(kate)

Group(students_in_koblenz)

IsFriendOf(john, kate)

IsMemberOf(john, students_in_koblenz)

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TBox

User \sqsubseteq \neg *Group*

Introduction to Description Logic - Interpretations

Interpretations

- ▶ Defined as $I = (\Delta^I, \cdot^I)$
- ▶ Assumption: objects in $\Delta^I =$ individuals in ABox
- ▶ Assign sets of objects to concepts
- ▶ Assign sets of tuples of objects to roles

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Possible interpretation

$\Delta^I = \{john, kate, students_in_koblenz\}$

$User^I = \{john, kate\}$

$Group^I = \{students_in_koblenz\}$

$IsFriendOf^I = \{(john, kate)\}$

$IsMemberOf^I = \{(john, students_in_koblenz)\}$

Queries in Description Logic

- ▶ Queries represented by Horn clauses
- ▶ Predicates represent concepts and roles

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Answer: $q^I = \{(\text{kate})\}$

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Answer: $q^I = \{(\text{kate})\}$

- ▶ Certain answer to q w.r.t. $W = \{I_1, \dots, I_n\}$: Tuple that is in every q^I
- ▶ Shorthand notation for set of certain answers: $\text{cert}(q, W)$

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- ▶ Certain answer to q w.r.t. $W = \{I_1, \dots, I_n\}$: Tuple that is in every q^{I_i}
- ▶ Shorthand notation for set of certain answers: $\text{cert}(q, W)$
- ▶ Views are represented by queries
- ▶ $v(x) \leftarrow \text{IsFriendOf}(\text{john}, x)$ is view that allows user to retrieve all of john's friends

View-based query answering

- ▶ Given: DL knowledge base K
- ▶ $MOD(K)$ = set of all models of K
- ▶ T = TBox of K
- ▶ $V = \langle v_1, \dots, v_n \rangle$: views, e.g. $v_1(x) \leftarrow IsFriendOf(john, x)$
- ▶ $E = \langle e_1, \dots, e_n \rangle$: certain extension of V
- ▶ $e_i = cert(v_i, MOD(K))$, e.g. $e_1 = \{(kate)\}$

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Solution

Set W of interpretations is solution to (T, V, E) if:

- ▶ All interpretations in W are models for T (not necessarily for K !)
- ▶ $cert(v_i, W) = e_i$

Tuple a is valid view-based answer to q w.r.t. (T, V, E) if
 $a \in cert(q, W)$ for all solutions W

Practical Example: A Simple Social Network

Concepts

- ▶ User
- ▶ Group
- ▶ Picture

Roles

- ▶ IsFriendOf
- ▶ IsMemberOf
- ▶ HasPicture
- ▶ IsOnPicture

We'll refer to our complete knowledge base (TBox T + ABox A) as K

Practical Example: A Simple Social Network

TBox

$Group \sqsubseteq \neg Picture$

$User \sqsubseteq \neg Picture$

$User \sqsubseteq \neg Group$

- ▶ Group, User, and Picture are disjoint

Practical Example: A Simple Social Network

ABox

User(john)

User(steve)

User(kate)

Group(students_in_koblenz)

Picture(pic1_jpg)

Picture(pic2_jpg)

IsMemberOf(john, students_in_koblenz)

IsMemberOf(kate, students_in_koblenz)

HasPicture(john, pic1_jpg)

HasPicture(john, pic2_jpg)

IsFriendOf(john, kate)

IsOnPicture(steve, pic1_jpg)

Practical Example: A Simple Social Network

Privacy policy

- ▶ Users cannot see members of a group they're not a member of:

$$v_1(x, y) \leftarrow \text{User}(\$id), \text{IsMemberOf}(\$id, x), \text{IsMemberOf}(y, x)$$

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- ▶ Users cannot see members of a group they're not a member of:

$$v_1(x, y) \leftarrow User(\$id), IsMemberOf(\$id, x), IsMemberOf(y, x)$$

- ▶ Users can only see pictures of friends and pictures they are on:

$$v_2(x, y) \leftarrow User(\$id), HasPicture(x, y), IsFriendOf(\$id, x)$$

$$v_2(x, y) \leftarrow User(\$id), HasPicture(x, y), IsOnPicture(\$id, y)$$

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Instantiated views for steve

$$v_1(x, y) \leftarrow User(steve), IsMemberOf(steve, x), IsMemberOf(y, x)$$

$$v_2(x, y) \leftarrow User(steve), HasPicture(x, y), IsFriendOf(steve, x)$$

$$v_2(x, y) \leftarrow User(steve), HasPicture(x, y), IsOnPicture(steve, y)$$

A useful interpretation

Consider the following interpretation I :

$\Delta^I =$

$\{john, steve, kate, students_in_koblenz, pic1_jpg, pic2_jpg\}$

$User^I = \{john, steve, kate\}$

$Group^I = \{students_in_koblenz\}$

$Picture^I = \{pic1_jpg, pic2_jpg\}$

$IsMemberOf^I =$

$\{(john, students_in_koblenz), (kate, students_in_koblenz)\}$

$HasPicture^I = \{(john, pic1_jpg), (john, pic2_jpg)\}$

$IsFriendOf^I = \{(john, kate)\}$

$IsOnPicture^I = \{(steve, pic1_jpg)\}$

- ▶ I is a model for K
- ▶ Every fact in I is in every other model for K as well
- ▶ $cert(v_i, \{I\}) = cert(v_i, MOD(K))$

Practical Example: A Simple Social Network

Computing the certain extensions

Remember:

$v_1(x, y) \leftarrow \text{User}(\text{steve}), \text{IsMemberOf}(\text{steve}, x), \text{IsMemberOf}(y, x)$

Practical Example: A Simple Social Network

Computing the certain extensions

Remember:

$v_1(x, y) \leftarrow User(steve), IsMemberOf(steve, x), IsMemberOf(y, x)$

- ▶ $IsMemberOf(steve, x)$ not true in I for any x
 - \implies body of v_1 always false under I (no answer)
 - $\implies e_1 = cert(v_1, MOD(K)) = cert(v_1, \{I\}) = \{\}$

Practical Example: A Simple Social Network

Computing the certain extensions

Remember:

$v_2(x, y) \leftarrow User(steve), HasPicture(x, y), IsFriendOf(steve, x)$

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Practical Example: A Simple Social Network

Computing the certain extensions

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$v_2(x, y) \leftarrow User(steve), HasPicture(x, y), IsOnPicture(steve, y)$

- ▶ $IsFriendOf(steve, x)$ not true in I for any x
 \implies first body of v_2 always false under I (no answer)
- ▶ But: $User(steve), HasPicture(john, pic1_jpg), IsOnPicture(steve, pic1_jpg)$ true in I
 $\implies (john, pic1_jpg)$ is answer under I
 $\implies e_2 = cert(v_2, MOD(K)) = cert(v_2, \{I\}) = \{(john, pic1_jpg)\}$

Practical Example: A Simple Social Network

Query entered by steve

$q_1(x) \leftarrow \text{IsMemberOf}(x, \text{students_in_koblenz})$

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Remember:

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Note: $\{I\}$ is solution to (T, V, E)

Create I' where I' is identical to I except that $\text{IsMemberOf}' = \{\}$

$\implies \text{cert}(v_1, \{I'\}) = e_1, \text{cert}(v_2, \{I'\}) = e_2$

$\implies \{I'\}$ is solution, but $\text{cert}(q_1, \{I'\}) = \{\}$

$\implies q_1$ has no answer

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$v_2(x, y) \leftarrow \text{User}(\text{steve}), \text{HasPicture}(x, y), \text{IsOnPicture}(\text{steve}, y)$

$(\text{john}, \text{pic1_jpg}) \in e_2$

$\implies (\text{john}, \text{pic1_jpg}) \in \text{cert}(v_2, \{I\})$

$\implies \text{HasPicture}(\text{john}, \text{pic1_jpg})$ true in every solution

$\implies (\text{pic1_jpg})$ is answer to q_2 . What about (pic2_jpg) ?

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$\implies \text{HasPicture}(\text{john}, \text{pic1_jpg})$ true in every solution

$\implies (\text{pic1_jpg})$ is answer to q_2 . What about (pic2_jpg) ?

Construct I^* such that I^* is identical to I except that
 $\text{HasPicture}^{I^*} = \{(\text{john}, \text{pic1_jpg})\}$ ($(\text{john}, \text{pic2_jpg})$ left out).

$\text{cert}(v_i, \{I^*\}) = \text{cert}(v_i, \{I\}) \implies \{I^*\}$ is solution

$(\text{pic2_jpg}) \notin \text{cert}(q_2, \{I^*\}) \implies$ not an answer

Conclusion

What have we accomplished?

- ▶ Explained why access control in knowledge bases is necessary
- ▶ Shown how ontologies can be written in Description Logics
- ▶ Transferred concept of views from relational database world to logic domain
- ▶ Shown how views can be used to control access to DL ontologies

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What have we accomplished?

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Prospect for the future

- ▶ Increase in popularity of DL as ontology language?
- ▶ Complex DL ontologies with advanced access control mechanisms?

